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1529 
One Trillion Dollars? An Analysis of Y2K 
Employment Implications for Attorneys∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The potential litigation arising from the Year 2000 com-
puter bug (Y2K) has sent attorneys scrambling to position 
themselves as advocates in the somewhat ethereal, yet intrigu-
ing, new legal field of technological entomology. “We’ve seen 
the $1 trillion estimate of costs, and nobody really knows what 
it will be . . . . But the number is so huge that even if it’s just a 
fraction of the estimate, it’s still a huge number.”1 Whether 
Y2K will actually create such an unprecedented source of em-
ployment revenue for lawyers is a question that will likely re-
main without a definitive answer until late in the year 2000. 
This article undertakes a predictive analysis of the effects of 
Y2K on attorney employment trends, identifying the viable 
analytical factors which both support and undermine the pre-
diction of a Y2K employment jackpot for attorneys. 
Part II provides a rudimentary introduction to the Y2K 
problem itself, including the media-reported predictions for 
Y2K-generated legal work and examples of documented Y2K 
malfunctions. Part III reviews Y2K legal work to date, specifi-
cally focusing on a sampling of Y2K lawsuits already filed. The 
legal theories supporting potential Y2K claims and prospective 
parties to such claims are addressed in Part IV. Finally, Part V 
balances the pro and con factors relating to Y2K attorney em-
ployment, resulting in the conclusion in Part VI that Y2K will 
not revolutionize the world of work for attorneys. 
 
∗ This article entered the publication process in October 1999. As the year 1999 
comes to a close, developments on Y2K issues have become almost a daily occurrence. 
And although attempts have been made to update the article’s substance during the 
publication process, some of the most recent developments may not be fully addressed 
due to publication constraints. 
 1. Steve Raabe, Millennium Bug a Boon for Lawyers – Legal Firms Seek to Ex-
ploit New Market, DENVER POST, Apr. 27, 1998, at E1 (quoting Steven Segal of Le-
Boeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. A Layperson’s Definition of Y2K 
“Y2K” is the less-than-ingenious abbreviation for the widely 
anticipated “Year 2000 computer problem.” It bears the alias of 
the “millennium bug” and other related variations.2 In most ba-
sic terms, Y2K is a three-character shorthand for describing 
the procedure whereby computers of many varieties attempt to 
change their internal calendars from December 31, 1999, to 
January 1, 2000. Unlike other predicted catastrophes, the pre-
cise moment of the Y2K attack has been known, to the nano-
second, for years. Y2K will arrive in all its glory (or maybe 
without attending glory) at 12:00:00 A.M. on January 1, 2000. 
The much-debated question is whether computers will recog-
nize the end of the millennium as the year 2000, or, having 
long since been programmed to assess year dates in only two 
digits, will interpret the digits “00” as “1900.” To the “nonte-
chie” masses, the practical application of this little glitch could 
represent the difference between having two weeks to pay a 
January 15 Visa bill before interest accrues and being more 
than ninety-nine years late on your payments at 17.5% inter-
est. Even nonmathematicians can appreciate the difference. 
Although Y2K is arguably a recent phenomenon, it actually 
had its inauspicious beginning decades ago during the infancy 
of the computer era. In the “dark ages” of computer use, prior 
to the time when computers could fit on top of a desk, be set on 
one’s lap, or be held in the palm of the hand, computer pro-
grammers, using the COBOL programming language, were 
limited to eighty-digit program sequences on computer “punch 
cards.”3 By punching holes in these cards, the functional 
equivalent of modern-day keyboards, programmers were able 
to input critical data applications. 
At some unknown point, facing the expense of computer 
memory and the scarcity of disk space, an executive decision 
 
 2. As part of a city public awareness campaign in St. Paul, Minnesota, the Y2K 
problem has its own mascot, a “cuddly-looking caterpillar called Millie the Millennium 
Bug.” Kevin Duchschere & Mark Brunswick, Governments Act to Ensure that Y2K’s 
Impact is Minimal, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 24, 1998, at 1B. 
 3. Chris Taylor, The History and the Hype; Computer Scientists May Disarm the 
Y2K Bomb in Time, But That Doesn’t Mean They Didn’t Screw Up, TIME, Jan. 18, 1999, 
at 72. 
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was likely made by a high-ranking wearer of pocket protectors 
to exclude the “1” and the “9” from the first two digits of the 
year designation, thus saving two spaces on the eighty-digit 
computer punch card.4  This frugality in the face of exponential 
growth in technological knowledge and production planted the 
insidious Y2K seed that not only provides hope of increased in-
come for attorneys, but also, according to the media, possibly 
threatens the continuation of civilization itself. 
B. Media Hype on Y2K Attorney Employment 
The hype on Y2K and attorney pocketbooks is that one tril-
lion dollars of litigation will result from Y2K legal issues.5 If 
the hype somehow becomes reality, Y2K may become the larg-
est employment gold mine lawyers have ever known—larger 
than asbestos, tobacco, and Dalkon shield combined. Moreover, 
Y2K litigation costs will surpass the cost of fixing the computer 
problem itself. The whopping thirteen-digit prediction is not 
uniquely a prognostication of media extremists; even Congress 
is reportedly concerned that litigation costs could reach the 
lofty trillion dollar figure.6 Although one trillion dollars seems 
to be the popular media figure for predicted litigation costs, 
some reports have doubled7 and even tripled8 that amount. 
Y2K buzz is also rapidly permeating legal circles. Some of 
the nation’s largest law firms have created Y2K practice groups 
or task forces. Many of these firms are scrambling to educate 
themselves on the legal issues that will flow from a Y2K com-
puter meltdown. Many of the hours spent investigating Y2K 
material are considered by these firms to be a “nonbillable in-
vestment.”9 Firms are also investing considerable time writing 
 
 4. See id. 
 5. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 6. See Pradnya Joshi & Richard Dalton Jr., As Revelers Ring in the 2000 Will 
There Be Chaos the World Over?, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 14, 1998, at C8 (“The 
Senate subcommittee studying the issue fears that litigation costs alone will hit $1 tril-
lion as shareholders sue heads of public corporations or companies sue each other for 
loss of business, computer failures and other difficulties that crop up.”). 
 7. See Deidra-Ann Parrish, Y2K Legal Risks, VARBUSINESS, Mar. 2, 1998, at 
18. 
 8. Thomas Donohue, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, 
purportedly indicated that the “trial bar is preparing to file lawsuits seeking between 
$1 trillion and $3 trillion.” Aaron Zitner, Another Y2K Pest: Lawsuits; Businesses Gear 
Up to Lobby Congress to Block Threats, B. GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1999, at D1. 
 9. Jenna Greene, Joining the Y2K Parade, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999, at S31 
(quoting Matthew Jacobs, a partner at the 450-lawyer firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, 
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Y2K memoranda for clients and speaking at Y2K conferences.10
 Given the enormity of the predicted financial figures, how-
ever, the current legal activities are not yet even beginning to 
scratch the surface of what lawyers hope will be a new para-
digm of legal employment. 
C. Actual Reported Y2K Incidents 
Unlike the Y2K “analysts” who have forecasted a trillion 
dollar windfall for attorneys, some critics have posited that 
Y2K is entirely a figment of media-generated propaganda. Such 
critics have already been proven wrong, as evidenced by the fol-
lowing reports of Y2K problems that have already surfaced: 
 
• A freeze-dried food company lost thousands of dollars of in-
ventory when the automated monitoring system interpreted 
the expiration date of “00” as 1900 instead of 2000.11 
 
• A limousine company assessed delinquency fees on credit 
accounts because its computer system read expiration dates 
of 2002 as 1902.12 
 
• A chocolate company’s computerized register system was 
routinely unable to process credit cards with an expiration 
date of 2000 or beyond. All credit card purchases had to be 
entered manually by employees with an alternate expira-
tion date.13 
 
• In Sacramento, California, during a Y2K computer check, 
jail computers, forwarded to the date of January 1, 2000, 
unlocked all the jail doors based on the interpretation that 
something catastrophic had occurred.14 
 
• In Frederick County, Maryland, another jail computer sys-
tem test yielded a miscalculation of release dates for in-
 
who spends 15 to 20 hours per week of nonbillable time reading Y2K materials). 
 10. See id. at S31-S32. 
 11. See Joshi & Dalton, supra note 6. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Ronald Rosenberg, The Millenium Bug and the Law; Potential Liability 
from Computer Pest Has Legal Eagles Bolstering Their Ranks, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 
1998, at F4. 
 14. See Duchschere & Brunswick, supra note 2. 
KON-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:29 AM 
1529]Y2K ATTORNEY EMPLOYMENT IMPLICATIONS 1533 
mates which would have mistakenly allowed some back on 
the streets.15 
 
• In what was called “ ‘the biggest visible occurrence of Y2K 
impact on the public,’ ” $30 million of premature food-stamp 
credits were dispersed to New Jersey recipients when the 
Department of Human Services attempted to correct Y2K 
computer problems.16 
 
This sampling is viewed by Y2K alarmists as being the 
ominous foreshadowing of the devastation to come. Y2K nonbe-
lievers counter that computer problems will be corrected by the 
time the millenium ends and no such problems will occur. To 
lawyers, however, the potential for liabilities and damages un-
der the foregoing scenarios is mind boggling. 
III. Y2K ATTORNEY EMPLOYMENT TO DATE 
A. Advisory Roles—“Preventive Maintenance” 
Much of the Y2K-related employment created for attorneys 
to date is not representative of the prognosticated litigation 
overload that will occur sometime during the year 2000. An 
overwhelming majority of Y2K work thus far has centered on 
consultation regarding Y2K “preventive maintenance.” Some 
firms have strategically played into the Y2K frenzy by speak-
ing at Y2K conferences, sending Y2K newsletters to clients, 
and creating Y2K Websites.17 
Most Y2K work thus far has been either transactional or 
advisory. The standard fare includes reviewing contracts, li-
censing agreements, and insurance policies in an attempt to 
avoid the Y2K litigation monster.18 The general content of 
much Y2K attorney advice, however, has been more generic 
than Y2K-specific: perform internal audits of contracts, make 
proper disclosures, document the vendor and client relation-
ship, and make a good-faith effort to correct problems.19 Essen-
 
 15. See id. 
 16. Mike Allen, $30 Million Error May Be a Precursor of Year 2000 Flaws, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999, at B1 (quoting Dr. Howard A. Rubin of Hunter College). 
 17. See Greene, supra note 9, at 531-32. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Joshi & Dalton, supra note 6. 
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tially, attorneys have been paid to counsel vendors and other 
corporations to give heightened scrutiny to the normal due dili-
gence paper trail. This trail includes supporting documentation 
that a company followed industry practices and devoted time 
and resources to the potential problem—i.e., show that the 
company did everything that was feasibly within its power to 
prevent Y2K problems.20 
A sizeable chunk of Y2K consultation has focused on corpo-
rate directors, a group considered to be at particular risk with 
regard to potential class action and shareholder suits. Advice to 
this group has focused on limiting liability for Y2K problems. 
Adequate insurance coverage (when possible), corporate bylaws 
that provide the utmost protection within the bounds of the 
law, and informed good faith seem to be the calling cards for 
corporate protection. Directors and officers have been coun-
seled to maintain documentation indicating that attempts have 
been made to stay informed regarding Y2K business and legal 
issues rather than relying without qualification on mainstream 
reports.21 
 In efforts somewhat more specific to Y2K, many attorneys 
have found an early pre-Y2K niche by assisting clients with 
Y2K compliance strategies using various assessment models.22 
For example, attorneys have suggested that directors and offi-
cers circulate questionnaires23 among members of their com-
 
 20. See Raabe, supra note 1. 
 21. See id. 
 22. An example risk assessment model is as follows: 
  1.  Create a Y2K task force or committee comprised of both the requisite 
technical specialists and upper-level managers with decision-making authority. 
  2.   Review all corporate computer systems to identify noncompliant systems. 
  3.   Assess the economics of repair versus abandonment of noncompliant sys-
tems. 
  4.   Identify all software licenses and contracts for noncompliant systems. 
  5.   Identify all software and hardware dependencies. 
  6.  Determine whether to conduct repairs in house or to hire outside consult-
ants. 
  7.   Establish test pilot programs for repair work. 
  8.   Establish a timetable for repair and testing systems. 
  9.   Develop contingency plans for all mission-critical systems. 
  10. Make a record of all corrective actions and systems modifications. 
Daniel W. Patterson, Advising Clients Regarding Year 2000 Compliance, COLO. LAW., 
Sept. 1998, at 6. 
 23. A sample six-step questionnaire is as follows: 
  1.  Has the company prepared an inventory of its computer systems to deter-
mine its ability to become Y2K compliant? 
  2.  Does the company have a plan to become Y2K compliant? If so, has the 
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pany’s supply chain. These questionnaires attempt to deter-
mine compliance standings of a company’s subcontractors, con-
sultants, distributors, etc., as well as measure the company’s 
own progress toward compliance. The questionnaires have been 
the subject of controversy, however, because of the general reti-
cence on the part of business owners to make binding state-
ments regarding Y2K compliance.24 As discussed more fully in 
Part V, the Federal Year 2000 Information and Readiness Dis-
closure Act has served to quell these fears somewhat. 
In short, the widely proliferating speculation regarding the 
potential dangers of the millennium bug has already created 
Y2K-related work for attorneys. Although most lawyer em-
ployment from Y2K has arguably been advisory work resulting 
from Y2K hype, some current court cases have provided a 
glimpse into the predicted avalanche of Y2K litigation. 
B. Litigation: A Look at “Pre-Y2K” Y2K Cases 
As early as January 1999, a reported 711 Y2K disputes 
hovered at the prefiling stage.25 Many more cases are filling the 
legal pipelines daily. By the beginning of the last quarter of 
1999, at least seventy-five Y2K-related actions had been filed.26 
This section will highlight the summaries of some of these 
cases. 
In looking at a sampling of Y2K cases, three variables will 
be assessed: (1) the basis of current actions; (2) the types of 
suits; and (3) alternative forums for dispute resolution. Focus-
ing on these variables places into context the foundation for 
 
company’s Board of Directors approved the plan? 
  3.  Has the company reviewed all of its license and maintenance agreements 
to determine whether its vendors have any obligations to make their software Y2K 
compliant? 
  4.  Has the company made a determination whether its critical suppliers will 
be Y2K compliant? 
  5.  Does the company have a plan to monitor its suppliers’ progress in becom-
ing Y2K compliant? 
  6.  Will the company agree to supplement its responses and provide periodic 
updated information regarding its progress toward compliance? 
Id. at 7. 
 24. See id. at 6-7 
 25. See Marcia Stepanek, A Better Vaccine Against Y2K Lawsuit Fever, BUS. WK., 
Jan. 11, 1999, at 48, 48. 
 26. See Federation of Insurance & Corporate Counsel, Year 2000 Lawsuits and 
Arbitrations That Have Been Filed (visited Sept. 16, 1999) <http://www.thefederation. 
org/Public/Y2K/lawsuits.htm> [hereinafter FICC Website]. 
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current and future Y2K disputes. 
1. Basis of current Y2K suits 
The majority of current Y2K suits focus on Y2K malfunc-
tion and noncompliant software. Other bases of Y2K litigation 
have included readiness disclosures, duty to remediate, and in-
surance coverage.27 
a. Y2K malfunction. The first Y2K malfunction to surface in 
a court setting occurred in Produce Palace International v. 
TEC-America Corp.28 Produce Palace (Palace), a grocery store 
chain, alleged that it suffered actual losses due to the failure of 
its credit card scanners to read expiration dates after Decem-
ber 31, 1999. In what some commentators consider to be a mi-
crocosmic foreshadowing of future Y2K litigation, Produce Pal-
ace brought suit against TEC-America Corp. (TEC), the 
manufacturer of the computerized cash register system, alleg-
ing the following causes of action: (1) breach of warranty; (2) 
violations of the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act; (3) breach of 
warranty of fitness; (4) revocation; (5) breach of duty of good 
faith; (6) negligent repair; (7) misrepresentation; and (8) viola-
tions of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act.29 
TEC cross-claimed against All American Cash Register, Inc. 
(All American), the retailer and installer of the computerized 
register and inventory system. TEC contended that it lacked 
privity of contract with Palace and sought sanctions against 
Palace for filing a meritless claim. In a June 15, 1998 bench 
ruling, the court denied TEC’s argument for sanctions against 
Palace, while dismissing five of the nine counts alleged against 
TEC in the complaint. The counts that survived dismissal were 
(1) breach of warranty; (2) breach of warranty of fitness; (3) 
negligent repair; and (4) misrepresentation.30 All American, 
meanwhile, remained subject to all nine counts. The case was 
eventually settled for $260,000, with TEC footing $250,000 of 
the bill and All American paying the remaining $10,000. Ironi-
cally, the settlement figure had been suggested months earlier 
by mediators.31 
 
 27. See id. 
 28. No. 97-3330-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct., Macomb County filed June 12, 1997). Infor-
mation regarding the case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
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The Produce Palace case provides an insight into potential 
parties to and causes of action for Y2K malfunctions. Advocates 
of the one trillion dollar litigation figure feel that the unique 
relationships between suppliers and vendors and the issues of 
causation demonstrated in Produce Palace are but a few of the 
matters which will require the litigation expertise of attorneys 
in the future. 
b. Noncompliant software. Most Y2K cases to date have not 
included actual Y2K malfunctions, but rather have been class 
action suits relating to noncompliant software. These suits 
have been brought in conjunction with currently functional 
software that happens to be noncompliant for the year 2000. 
The trend to date has been for courts to reject arguments of po-
tential or imminent damages resulting from software flaws.32 
Peerless Wall and Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, 
Inc.33 was a class action suit in which the plaintiffs alleged that 
defendant Synchronics sold noncompliant business software. 
Synchronics moved for a six-month stay, offering to research 
and subsequently fix the problem at no charge to the public, 
noting that the alleged damages were purely speculative. In 
granting a limited stay of six weeks, the court summarized the 
current pulse of most Y2K actions: “I can see no prejudice in 
granting a limited stay to allow the defendant to potentially 
cure the problem and avoid the need for litigation (and the 
transaction costs that go with it) altogether.”34 
In a software upgrade case, Atlaz International, Inc. v. 
Software Business Technologies,35 the plaintiffs, a class of soft-
ware purchasers, brought suit when the defendant software 
manufacturer, Software Business Technologies (SBT), at-
tempted to charge for its Y2K compliant software upgrade. SBT 
argued that its upgrade provided many features in addition to 
Y2K compliance. The case eventually settled with SBT agree-
 
 32. United States District Court Judge Ruben Castillo, in prefacing the court’s 
holding, aptly summarized the state of pre-Year 2000 Y2K litigation: “As we near the 
Twenty-First Century, the media has focused on many potential Y2K problems. This 
focus will inevitably lead to much litigation, . . . which the courts will need to deter-
mine is meritful or meritless. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, we find this lawsuit falls 
in the latter category.” Kaczmarek v. Microsoft Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 974, 974 (N.D. Ill. 
1999). 
 33. No. 98-1084, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20147 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1998). 
 34. Id. at *3. 
 35. No. 172539 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County filed Dec. 2, 1997). Information 
regarding the case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26. 
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ing to provide a free “no frills” upgrade to its existing custom-
ers. In connection with the settlement, SBT agreed not to op-
pose plaintiffs’ attorney fees and costs of up to $565,000.36 
2. Types of Y2K suits 
Not only do the factual foundations for pre-Y2K suits fall 
into predictable patterns, but the legal classifications in which 
they have been couched are also identifiable: class actions, 
shareholder actions, and non-litigation, dispute resolution al-
ternatives. 
a. Class actions. Six class action suits have been filed 
against Intuit, Inc., three in New York and three in Califor-
nia.37 The complaints filed against Intuit, the manufacturer of 
the popular personal accounting software Quicken, alleged that 
the on-line banking features of certain versions of Quicken 
were not Y2K compliant.38 The general causes of action, com-
mon to each of the suits, included breach of implied and ex-
press warranties, anticipatory repudiation, and failure to pro-
vide adequate assurances. Based on these alleged violations by 
Intuit, the plaintiff groups sought injunctive relief to prevent 
Intuit from selling defective versions of Quicken.39 In addition, 
the complaint sought refunds to those who purchased noncom-
pliant software, compensatory damages, treble damages, puni-
tive damages, attorneys fees, and court costs.40 Although all of 
the complaints were nearly identical in substance, one com-
plaint made an additional allegation. In Faegenburg v. Intuit, 
Inc.,41 the plaintiff argued that the Y2K compliancy issue has 
been common knowledge in the computer software industry 
since the early 1970s, but nonetheless had been purposely ig-
nored because of the expense of correcting the problem.42 
 
 36. See id. 
 37. Citation material regarding these cases is not available in any widely dis-
tributed database; however, the information on these case which is pertinent to this 
article is available through the FICC Website.  See supra note 26. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. No. 98602587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York County filed May 26, 1998) (informa-
tion regarding this case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26). 
 42. Robert Bemer, a computer programmer who wrote much of the COBOL com-
puter language, published the earliest Y2K warning in 1971. Bemer’s warnings went 
largely, if not completely, ignored by IBM executives. Again, in 1979, Bemer published 
a Y2K warning which bluntly stated, “ ‘Don’t drop the first two digits. The program 
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In response, Intuit contended that it had not been given an 
opportunity to cure prior to the plaintiffs’ institution of litiga-
tion. Prior to the filing of the six lawsuits, Intuit had posted on 
its Website a listing of noncompliant products with a dis-
claimer that on-line banking users would have access to an up-
grade by the end of June 1999. By the time the cases were 
heard in New York and California courts, Intuit had appar-
ently sent notification to Quicken users that Y2K compliant 
upgrades would be available free of charge.43 
In what might prove to be a precedential foreshadowing of 
pre-January 1 2000 Y2K adjudication, all six suits were dis-
missed essentially due to a “lack of harm.”44 Moreover, all three 
California suits were dismissed with prejudice. In In re Intuit, 
Inc.,45 the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that 
Intuit’s remedial measure of providing free compliant upgrades 
did not provide a comprehensive solution. Among other things, 
the amended complaint alleged Intuit could rescind the offer at 
any time, Quicken’s technical support division continued to 
counsel users to purchase the Quicken 98 upgrade, the compli-
ant upgrade was available only on the Internet, and some cus-
tomers had already paid for the upgrade. In response, the court 
ruled that not only had no damage been shown, but no proof of 
imminent damage had been offered to the court. However, the 
court did allow the plaintiffs to amend the complaint on the 
section 17200 claim under the California Unfair Practices Act 
(permitting only an injunction) to determine whether Intuit 
engaged in unfair trade practices by purportedly providing mis-
information regarding the June 1999 Y2K compliant Quicken 
upgrade.46 However, the amended complaint was ultimately 
dismissed as well.47 
At the time of this writing, the most frequently sued defen-
dant has been Medical Manager Corp., the manufacturer of a 
widely used medical bookkeeping software program. In total, 
eight class action lawsuits have been filed against Medical 
 
may well fail from ambiguity.’ ” Taylor, supra note 3, at 72 (quoting Bemer). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 45. No. CV773646 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County filed April 28, 1998). In-
formation regarding this case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 46. For a discussion of the Intuit cases see FICC Website, supra note 26. See also 
Walter J. Andrews et al., Reading Early Returns, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999, at S34. 
 47. See FICC Website, supra note 26. 
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Manager.48 The claims against Medical Manager have involved 
the sale of a major noncompliant version of the software with a 
compliant version being sold shortly after. Six cases having 
similar claims have been settled with the plaintiff class either 
receiving a free software upgrade or a share of the settlement 
pool. The settlement pool of $1.455 million will be half-depleted 
by legal expenses.49 
One of the suits against Medical Manager is substantially 
different because the plaintiff alleged an actual threat of physi-
cal harm to patients treated by the association’s 110,000 physi-
cians. In Highland Park Medical Associates, S.C. v. Medical 
Manager Corp.,50 the complaint alleged that the critical sys-
tems maintained by the software, such as treatment plan 
maintenance and analysis, inventory management, patient 
flow tracking, and performance statistics, would be jeopardized 
by the inability of the software to process post-1999 dates. Al-
though the plaintiffs conceded that no actual injury had oc-
curred, they asserted “a clear and present danger of risk and 
potential harm to patients of medical specialists.”51 In the trial 
scheduled to commence at the end of 1999, Highland Park 
seeks punitive damages, injunctive relief, and compensatory 
damages.52 
b. Shareholder actions. As a result of the multiple class ac-
tion suits filed against Medical Manager, a Y2K shareholder 
suit was filed against Medical Manager, its chairman, presi-
dent, chief financial officer, chief of operations, general counsel, 
three other directors, and all four of the securities brokers that 
handled the company’s initial public offering in 1997.53 The 
complaint first alleged that Medical Manager made false 
statements in its prospectus, thus violating section 11 of the 
Securities Act.54 The remaining allegations were that the bro-
kers failed to perform due diligence investigations, and that the 
directors and officers of Medical Manager were liable parties 
 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. No. 98 C 7022 (N.D. Ill. Am. Compl. filed Nov. 5, 1998). Information regard-
ing this case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 51. Andrews et al., supra note 46, at S35. 
 52. See FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 53. See Ehlert v. Singer, No. 8:98-CV-02168 (M.D. Fla. filed Nov. 2, 1998) (infor-
mation regarding the case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26). 
 54. See FICC Website, supra note 26. 
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under section 15.55 Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that 
the original purchasers of the stock were not adequately in-
formed that the company intended to “shorten the life span” of 
its software by promoting the Y2K compliant version shortly 
after marketing the original software.56 
In other Y2K shareholder cases, five suits have been filed 
against Peritus Software, a provider of Y2K remediation soft-
ware, and its directors and officers. The suits, expected to be 
consolidated, assert that Peritus violated federal securities 
laws by making false and misleading statements and by failing 
to disclose material information regarding the acquisition of 
another company, Millennium Dynamics, Inc., which allegedly 
resulted in an artificial inflation of Peritus stock.57 
Among the first shareholder cases to be settled were two 
consolidated cases, Steinberg v. Command Systems Inc.58 and 
Doney v. Command Systems, Inc.59 The plaintiffs alleged that 
Command Systems leveraged public Y2K hype by falsely repre-
senting that the company would focus on selling Y2K solutions 
to businesses. The terms of the settlement included a pool of 
$5.75 million plus interest to be used in paying attorneys fees 
and expenses and compensating those who purchased the stock 
between March 12 and April 29, 1998.60 
In addition to the lack of damages defense, defendants have 
defeated Y2K claims on contractual grounds. In Young v. J. 
Baker, Inc.,61 Arthur Andersen & Co. filed an action seeking 
declaratory relief after one of its consultees demanded that it 
be reimbursed for a ten-year-old computer system whose Y2K 
compliancy was at issue. In June 1998, J. Baker, Inc., a na-
tional retailer, threatened to sue Arthur Andersen for work it 
had done on Baker’s computer merchandising system nearly 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. Andrews et al., supra note 46, at S35. To date, six suits have been filed in 
connection with the alleged securities fraud. See id. 
 57. See FICC Website, supra note 26 (referencing Cohen v. Chan, Downey v. 
Chan, Renslett v. Chan, Lindsay v. Peritus Software, and Teague v. Peritus Software). 
 58. No. 98-3320 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 8, 1998). Information regarding this case can 
be found at FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 59. No. 98-3279 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 6, 1998) (information regarding this case can 
be found at FICC Website, supra note 26). 
 60. See id. 
 61. No. 98-01597 (Mass. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 28, 1998) (information regarding 
this case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26); see also Matthew Schlesinger 
& Suzette Derrevere, When Did You Know?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999, at S36. 
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ten years earlier. In 1990, Baker had hired Arthur Andersen to 
recommend merchandising and accounting software and to in-
stall a functional new system. Arthur Andersen did so without 
disclosing that the system was not Y2K compliant. Baker as-
serted that its current costs, spent to make the system Y2K 
compliant, should be reimbursed by Arthur Andersen. Arthur 
Andersen contended that its actions fell well within the con-
tractual agreement that had governed the business relation-
ship, noting the following: 
During the relevant 1989-1991 time period, making J. Baker’s 
system Year 2000 compliant was not economically viable. At 
the time, the only mainframe software packages available to 
support J. Baker’s requirements were not Year 2000 compli-
ant. Customizing any of the then available software packages 
would have been significantly more expensive to J. Baker 
than the costs of repairs that J. Baker, benefiting from subse-
quent advances in Year 2000 remediation technology, has in-
curred to date.62 
After submitting their dispute to mediation and receiving 
an evaluation in favor of Arthur Andersen, J. Baker released 
the following statement: “J. Baker re-evaluated its claims and 
is now satisfied that Andersen Consulting had met all of its 
contractual obligations to J. Baker.”63 
In Paragon Networks International v. Macola, Inc.,64 a dis-
pute centered on a contractual disclaimer barring all claims for 
express and implied warranty. Paragon attempted to invalidate 
the contract by arguing that no meeting of the minds occurred 
because it could not negotiate the terms of the disclaimer, and 
that the disclaimer itself was unconscionable. In dismissing the 
claim, the court held that defendant Macola had, “ ‘in accor-
dance with its licensing agreement, fulfilled all its contractual 
and legal obligations to its end users.’ ”65 
 
 62. Schlesinger & Derrevere, supra note 61, at S36 (quoting statement by Ander-
son Consulting). 
 63. FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 64. No. 98CV0119 (Ohio Ct. C.P. filed April 1, 1998). Information regarding the 
case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26.  See also Andrews et al., supra note 
46, at S34. 
 65. FICC Website, supra note 26 (quoting http://biz.yahoocom/bw/981221/acola_ 
sof_1.html). 
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3. Alternative forums for Y2K dispute resolution 
In the first Y2K case decided by arbitration award, INCO 
Alloys International, Inc. asserted a $3.9 million claim against 
ASE Limited for Y2K remediation costs.66 ASE, a developer and 
installer of integrated computer systems and software for in-
dustrial companies, actually instigated the action when INCO 
attempted to terminate the parties’ contract. ASE sued INCO, 
and, according to contractual stipulation, filed for arbitration 
by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The AAA arbi-
trator rejected INCO’s $3.9 million claim, stating that “[t]here 
was no evidence presented which would indicate that the issue 
of year 2000 mitigation or remediation was ever added to the 
contract by a writing signed and agreed to by both parties. . . . 
[Year 2000] remediation was not clearly called for in the con-
tract documents.”67 
C. Summary of Y2K Litigation to Date 
The Y2K cases to date have provided limited, yet interest-
ing insights into potential litigation. Nearly half of the filed 
cases have involved claims for free Y2K compliant software up-
grades, and another fourth have involved shareholder actions. 
Eighteen of the first twenty Y2K suits filed have either been 
settled or dismissed.68 Courts have been reluctant to buy into 
the Y2K hype and have maintained the traditional position of 
requiring damages before adjudicating against the rights of a 
defendant. 
The findings of early shareholder cases have followed this 
theory as several classes of shareholders have successfully 
demonstrated damage from Y2K-induced or -related discrepan-
cies in stock prices. Defendants have found a haven in contrac-
tual agreements, which do not explicitly call for Y2K remedies. 
This safe harbor was aptly described by Arthur J. Schwab of 
Buchanan Ingersoll after successfully defending the ASE arbi-
tration claim against INCO Alloys: “ ‘[This] decision is a warn-
ing to any company purchasing, using, selling or developing 
software, that contracts involving software development should 
identify all specific Year 2000 tasks to be performed and clearly 
 
 66. See ASE, Ltd. v. INCO Alloys Int’l, Inc., (Wycoff, Arb.). Information regarding 
the case can be found at FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See FICC Website, supra note 26. 
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describe any Year 2000 obligations.’ ”69 
In sum, Y2K cases to date provide an inkling of future law-
suits but are far from definitive precedents, especially for post-
1999 litigation. Perhaps the clearest indicator evolving from 
the initial Y2K litigation is that class actions, specifically 
shareholder class actions, will be the lawsuit of choice. Plaintiff 
class action giant Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach 
has led the Y2K litigation bandwagon, having its hand in a 
third of all Y2K lawsuits to date.70 Directors and officers ap-
pear to be an early target. Also, assuming that damages occur 
from Y2K problems, especially damages without a clear causal 
link, early returns on Y2K litigation would appear to favor de-
fendants who are either contractually protected or who have 
made good faith efforts to address the problem. The sum total 
of the early returns, however, does not provide a solid founda-
tion for either confirming or discounting a Y2K financial bo-
nanza for attorneys. 
IV. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF FUTURE Y2K 
LITIGATION 
A. Potential Causes of Action in Y2K Suits 
In coming to grips with the potential parameters of Y2K ac-
tions, commentators have theorized upon standard causes of 
action likely to surface if the computer bug is not exterminated 
by January 1, 2000. One writer described the legal issues as 
follows: “On the horizon are potential suits involving fraud, 
breach of warranty, liability, personal injury, and a variety of 
shareholder actions against company directors for failing to 
prepare for the year 2000. The possibilities are endless.”71 
Most compilers of speculative lists of Y2K causes of action 
openly admit that the lists are just that—speculative. Many in-
clude at least some of the following: (1) breach of express or 
implied warranty, where a supplier did not deliver a product on 
time, or delivered a product that did not meet the determined 
standard of quality; (2) breach of contract; (3) misrepresenta-
 
 69. PRNewswire, Nov. 24, 1998, available at FICC Website, supra note 26 (al-
teration in original) (quoting Arthur J. Schwab). 
 70. See FICC Website, supra note 26. 
 71. Ashley Dunn, Year 2000 Bug Likely to Infest Courtrooms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
1998, at A1 (emphasis added). 
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tion of Y2K compliance; (4) deceptive practice in failing to dis-
close Y2K compliance; (5) violation of securities law where di-
rectors and officers are held liable in class action shareholder 
suits for devaluation of stock prices due to undisclosed or un-
addressed Y2K problems; (6) product liability from injury due 
to Y2K malfunctions; and (7) criminal charges in states which 
have criminalized the production or sale of systems or pro-
grams that result in damage.72 
Thomas Vartanian, the chairman of the American Bar As-
sociation’s Committee on Cyberspace Law, narrowed the list to 
three principal scenarios: (1) breach of contract (e.g., a 1992 
computer contract indicates that the system will remain func-
tional for ten years but goes haywire during the year 2000); (2) 
negligence (e.g., a company dismisses Y2K as mere media hype 
and does not make good faith efforts [based on a reasonably 
prudent businessperson standard] to correct the problem); and 
(3) false and intentionally deceiving statements (e.g., a com-
pany assures its clients that its computer software is compliant 
when in fact it is not).73 
To date, only some of these potential causes of action have 
surfaced in Y2K lawsuits, principally because the predicted 
calling card of Y2K, computer malfunctions, has not occurred 
on a significant scale. In simple terms, the “real” damage from 
Y2K computer glitches has not yet reared its ugly head. If or 
when it does, the true gamut of causes of action will surface. 
In addition to couching Y2K litigation in terms of tradi-
tional causes of action, the potential exists for the assertion of a 
cause of action for computer malpractice. And while computer 
malpractice has not yet garnered significant attention, it could 
emerge from the Y2K melee. In the past, most courts have been 
reticent to recognize such a tort; nevertheless, it has not gone 
completely without support. As early as 1986, in Data Process-
ing Services, Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp.,74 computer malprac-
tice was recognized as a tortious cause of action. The court rec-
ognized the distinction between contracts for the sale or 
purchase of goods (falling under article 2 of the UCC) and con-
 
 72. See John Drake, Courting Trouble: Year 2000 Bug Could Trigger Avalanche 
of Lawsuits, BUS. J., Apr. 20, 1998, at 12. 
 73. See Michael Newman, Lawyers Wind Up As Time Runs Out; Y2K’s Legal 
Problems May Be Worse than Its Technical Ones, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 
1998, at C-1. 
 74. 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
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tracts for the performance of services as it applied uniquely to 
the arena of “computer programming.”75 
In Smith Oil, Smith, a vendor of petroleum products, en-
tered into an oral contract with Data Processing Services (DPS) 
to develop computer software and a computer accounting sys-
tem to meet Smith’s specific business needs.76 When it became 
apparent to Smith that DPS was unable to implement a system 
that met Smith’s needs, Smith refused to pay DPS’s bill of 
$7,166.25, and a lawsuit, filed by DPS, ensued.77 The court 
noted that “Smith bargained for DPS’s skill in developing a 
system to meet its specific needs,” and furthermore that “[t]he 
situation here is more analogous to a client seeking a lawyer’s 
advice or a patient seeking medical treatment for a particular 
ailment than it is to a customer buying seed corn, soap, or cam 
shafts.”78 The court then implicitly created the “computer mal-
practice” standard by stating that “[t]hose who hold themselves 
out to the world as possessing skill and qualifications in their 
respective trades or professions impliedly represent they pos-
sess the skill and will exhibit the diligence ordinarily possessed 
by well informed [sic] members of the trade or profession.”79 
To date, however, Smith Oil appears to be a lone voice in 
the wilderness, as other jurisdictions have specifically ad-
dressed and rejected the notion of a new tort of computer mal-
practice. As early as 1979, during the Neanderthal era of com-
puter systems, the Second Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s attempt 
to analogize medical malpractice to the manufacture of com-
puter “machinery.”80 During that same year, in Chatlos Sys-
tems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.,81 a federal district 
court in New Jersey established a widely-cited precedent by 
stating: 
The novel concept of a new tort called “computer malpractice” 
is premised upon a theory of elevated responsibility on the 
part of those who render computer sales and service. Plaintiff 
 
 75. Id. at 318. 
 76. See id. at 316. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 319. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 744-46 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
 81. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 635 F.2d 1081 
(3d Cir. 1980). 
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equates the sale and servicing of computer systems with es-
tablished theories of professional malpractice. Simply because 
an activity is technically complex and important to the busi-
ness community does not mean that greater potential liability 
must attach. In the absence of sound precedential authority, 
the Court declines the invitation to create a new tort.82 
In subsequent cases, during a more “modern” era of com-
puter technology, courts in Connecticut,83 Illinois,84 and New 
Jersey85 have also rejected “computer malpractice” arguments. 
In Hospital Computer Systems, Inc. v. Staten Island Hospital, 
the New Jersey court expounded upon the policy argument be-
hind prohibiting a cause of action for computer malpractice by 
distinguishing between standards for computer “consultants” 
and those for professionals such as doctors, lawyers, account-
ants, engineers, and architects.86 The court stated that such 
professionals, as opposed to computer consultants, could be 
held to malpractice standards “because the higher standards of 
care imposed on them by their profession and by state licensing 
requirements engenders trust in them by clients that is not the 
norm of the marketplace. When no such higher code of ethics 
binds a person, such trust is unwarranted.”87 
Even if the threat of Y2K alters the adjudicative mind of 
courts to create a computer malpractice cause of action, the 
ramifications of such a cause of action are unclear. Certainly, 
“injured” plaintiffs would be given another weapon in their ar-
senal of legal attack, but the question lingers: what profes-
sional standard would be established for computer “profession-
als?” If the standard were “good faith or best efforts in light of 
available technology,” many in the computer industry would be 
indemnified by maintaining efforts that fall within the industry 
standard. 
 
 82. Id. at 741 n.1. 
 83. See Metpath, Inc. v. IDS Corp., No. CV 89-0435312S, 1991 WL 39617 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1991). 
 84. See Rogers Merchandising, Inc. v. Bojangles’ Corp., No. 87C5001, 1989 WL 
6391 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 1989). 
 85. See Hospital Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351 
(D.N.J. 1992). 
 86. See id. at 1361. 
 87. Id. 
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B. Potential Defenses in Y2K Suits 
The possibility of multiple legal defenses further muddies 
the waters of Y2K predictive analysis. The viability of a com-
parative negligence defense—specifically, assumption of the 
risk—improves by the day as Y2K steals media headlines. This 
defense may be asserted against plaintiffs who fail to identify 
and remedy problems in the face of a widely publicized con-
cern.88 Because Y2K has already been identified as a potential 
problem well in advance of any actual malfunction, implied as-
sumption of risk and contributory negligence may significantly 
diminish liability on the part of a Y2K defendant.89 The critical 
assessment will be the plaintiff’s conduct and duty of care.90 
The defense of the economic loss doctrine may apply in 
cases where a party sustains damage to a “Y2K-infected” prod-
uct or where losses are sustained due to the malfunctioning 
product. This doctrine provides a defense for a manufacturer 
against the commercial purchaser of a product for damages 
that are purely economic in nature. In part, the adjudicative 
rationale behind this doctrine is that such purchasers do not 
warrant special “tort protection” because economic losses are 
insurable.91 However, this defense is limited to tort theories 
based on negligence and strict liability and does not extend to 
personal injuries nor to damage to other property.92 In applica-
tion, the doctrine is far from clear: 
[C]ourts will need to decide, in the context of the Year 2000 
Problem, whether the contract in dispute is for goods or for 
services. Indeed, software licenses may possess both the ele-
ments of services (which are excluded from the U.C.C. and 
may be exempted from the economic loss rule) and goods 
(which are not so exempted.) [sic]93 
The statute of limitations defense may come into play due 
to the very nature of Y2K claims. Under the UCC, a statute be-
gins to run when a breach of contract is first discovered, or 
 
 88. See Patterson, supra note 22, at 12. 
 89. See Charles Kerr et al., Tort Liability from the Bites of the Millennium Bug, 
in UNDERSTANDING, PREVENTING AND LITIGATING YEAR 2000 ISSUES: WHAT EVERY 
LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW NOW, 259 passim, 506 PLI/Pat 259. 
 90. See id. at 299. 
 91. See id. at 291-94. 
 92. See Patterson, supra note 22, at 12. 
 93. Kerr et al., supra note 89, at 294. 
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when it should have been discovered.94 Even outside of a UCC 
analysis, statute of limitation issues may be triggered as early 
as when the company learned of its Y2K problem or when it 
initiated its remedial expenditures. Given the uncertain nature 
of Y2K claims, however, many companies may be hesitant to 
file suit until they have a firmer grasp, in terms of cost-benefit 
analysis, on whether the recovery of their costs and/or damages 
is economically worthwhile.95 
Other defenses could include: force majeure (where Y2K 
qualifies as an impediment beyond the control of a company), 
disclaimer of warranties and limitations of remedies (if appro-
priately delineated and agreed to in the party’s contract), the 
business judgment rule (where officers and directors have, in 
good faith, exercised their business judgment), and, finally, 
sovereign immunity.96 
The difficulty of proving causation in tort actions, although 
not an affirmative defense, may well serve as such. Under most 
tort law, a plaintiff must show that damages were a direct  
result of a defendant’s action, independent of other causes.97 
The causation dilemma is perhaps best summed up as follows: 
“Given the nature of the Year 2000 problem, which involves 
long time spans, multiple layers and suppliers of software  
code and computer equipment, intervening measures, and the  
notorious and widespread publicity, a party attempting to re-
cover its damages in tort will face difficult hurdles of proving 
causation.”98 
C. Potential Parties in Y2K Suits 
Broadly stated, potential parties in Y2K suits include all 
breathing human beings except, perhaps, mountain cave-
dwellers. Indeed, part of the foundation beneath the lofty liti-
gation prognostication is laid by the potentially interconnected 
web of parties, each with multiple causes of action. 
Businesses, ranging from small, privately-owned companies 
to Fortune 500 giants, are the obvious players in future Y2K 
lawsuits as plaintiffs, defendants, or even both at once. Possi-
 
 94. See UCC § 2-725(2); see also Patterson, supra note 22, at 12. 
 95. See Patterson, supra note 22, at 12. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 956 (4th ed. 1968). 
 98. Kerr et al., supra note 89, at 297-98. 
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ble defendants in litigation instigated by businesses are their 
suppliers, software providers, law firms, accounting firms, and 
insurers.99 
Businesses will also be easy targets for lawsuits. They may 
be sued by both their customers and their vendors. As has been 
seen in early Y2K litigation, companies may be particularly 
susceptible to shareholder suits. If the full fury of Y2K is real-
ized, however, it is likely that legal “diagrams” of Y2K litiga-
tion will become a convoluted trellis of arrows between multi-
ple parties, as demonstrated in the following hypothetical: 
Consider the case of an auto dealer who loses sales in Janu-
ary 2000 because the manufacturer did not ship cars as a re-
sult of the computer problem. 
The dealer sues the shipper and the carmaker. The carmaker 
in turn sues any parts supplier that had computer failures. 
Insurance companies could get dragged into the fray; share-
holders could file suit against corporations and directors.100 
Theoretically, one computer glitch anywhere in the manufac-
turer-to-end-user chain could result in a domino effect reaching 
a multitude of associated parties. Each Y2K malfunction could 
implicate the hardware or software vendor, the vendors end-
line-using client, the client’s shareholders, the client’s consult-
ants and contractors, the client’s auditors, and the vendor’s and 
client’s insurance companies.101 
A less-publicized area of potential litigation is that related 
to employee benefits. A press release issued by the United 
States Department of Labor (DOL) has warned administrators 
of employee benefit plans that they will be legally at risk for 
Y2K-related disturbances to benefit plans.102 The release fur-
ther noted that the DOL “will hold fiduciaries personally liable 
for any loss or interruption of benefits that occur because of 
Y2K problems that could have been avoided had the fiduciaries 
acted prudently with regard to the problem.”103 
 
 99. See Sean Horgan, Y2K-Related Litigation May Reach $1 Trillion, INDIAN-
APOLIS STAR, Dec. 15, 1998, at C13. 
 100. Doug Abrahms, Many Fear Year-2000 Bug Will Breed Suits; Case Against 
Computer Maker Watched Closely, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at B8. 
 101. See Patterson, supra note 22, at 8. 
 102. See Timothy J. Snyder, Fiduciaries Face Risk from Y2K Noncompliance, DEL. 
EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, Nov. 19, 1998, at 6. 
 103. Id. 
KON-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:29 AM 
1529]Y2K ATTORNEY EMPLOYMENT IMPLICATIONS 1551 
The DOL also warned that plan administrators would be 
held responsible for noncompliant third-party service providers 
as well.104 Even within the niche area of employee benefits, 
several additional potential parties emerge, adding to the list of 
potential Y2K litigants. Of course, it should be noted that the 
United States government itself may not be immune from in-
volvement in litigation. 
Finally, lawyers will inevitably be involved in Y2K litiga-
tion, not only as advocates, but also as parties. Liability for le-
gal malpractice appears principally on two fronts: (1) a law 
firm’s own computer malfunction, or (2) inadequate advice 
given to clients. In technologically “modernized” law firms, cli-
ent files, filing deadlines, statute of limitation dates, billing 
hours, and many other critical data are stored and manipu-
lated on computer networks. Suppose a law firm computer sys-
tem were to crash without sufficient hard copy back-up. At a 
minimum, law firms would be subject to countless nonbillable 
hours of redoing work, and, at worst, subject to a plethora of 
malpractice suits.105 Even if attorney computer systems remain 
functional, law firms may face malpractice suits. If firms take 
Y2K too lightly, and problems occur, lawsuits are likely to be 
filed by non-Y2K-prepared clients. If firms significantly drain 
client budgets to prepare them for Y2K and nothing happens, 
attorney-client relations may be irreparably strained. 
In sum, the most comprehensive description of potential 
parties in Y2K litigation is “everyone”—literally. If Y2K doom-
sayers are correct, the failure of computers, which seemingly 
link humanity together in our technological age, will affect  
everyone to one degree or another. To those who feel insulated 
from the reaches of Y2K because they “don’t own a desktop 
computer or run their business with a computer,” a closer look 
at what makes their everyday life run (i.e., cars, telephones, 
television, utilities, credit cards, banks, food distribution, etc.) 
will reveal that computers are nearly as pervasive as oxygen. 
V. THE TRILLION DOLLAR QUESTION: A LOOK AT THE 
BALANCING FACTORS 
This section analyzes the contingencies that will influence 
 
 104. See id. 
 105. See James A.A. Pabarue & Randy J. Maniloff, Millenial Malpractice Tops List 
of Lawyers’ Y2K Woes, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 22, 1999, at B9. 
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whether or not the employment scheme of attorneys will be 
radically altered. These indicators are analyzed on a balancing 
scale, providing support for this paper’s ultimate conclusion. 
A. Factors Pointing Toward a Y2K Windfall 
1. The general pervasiveness of computers 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the pervasiveness of 
computers is perhaps the greatest indicator of a litigation tidal 
wave. In addition to the disruptions that could occur from com-
puter glitches in utility companies (disrupting electricity, gas, 
and water services), the following scenarios have been posited 
as potential Y2K mishaps: 
The FAA will ground all aircraft because, according to com-
puter records, all of the planes are 99 years overdue for air-
frame and engine overhauls. 
The FAA will not allow pilots to fly because the computer re-
cords indicate that they have been on duty for 875,000 hours, 
in clear violation of union and FAA work rules. 
Those who use calling cards to initiate telephone calls shortly 
before midnight on December 31, 1999 will be charged for 53 
million minutes. 
Those with $1000 in their bank account on December 31, 1999 
will have $400,000 on January 1, 2000. 
Visa charges for New Year’s Eve will show up on January 
2000 bills as $212 million, due to a ninety-nine year unpaid, 
outstanding balance. 
Video stores will send out bills of $100,000 per video for seri-
ously overdue video tapes.106 
 
Though facetious, these tongue-in-cheek scenarios of “Y2K day 
one” expose many of the problems that could play out under the 
full wrath of Y2K. Even one of the hypothetical problems ad-
 
 106. Gary E. Clayton et al., The Year 2000 Headache “Two Thousand Zero-Zero. 
Party’s Over. Oops, Out of Time.” 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 753, 755-56 (1997) (footnote 
omitted). 
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dressed above could create, at a minimum, inconveniences that 
unravel the routines of everyday living. Anyone who has ever 
experienced billing, banking, or similar computer errors can at-
test to this. 
Although it is far from certain that catastrophic computer 
problems will occur during the year 2000, it is indisputable 
that the daily routines of American life revolve around com-
puter-influenced systems. Even those fleeing to live in the 
mountains in an attempt to escape Y2K must watch the night 
skies for plummeting computer-run airplanes or satellites that 
might disrupt their rustic seclusion. In less dramatic terms, the 
fact that computers permeate nearly every aspect of standard 
living bodes well for attorneys seeking to cash in on Y2K. 
2. The role of small businesses 
Another indicator on the side of an attorney litigation bo-
nanza is the fact that small businesses are a focal point of Y2K 
problems. Almost without exception, all large businesses 
spending inordinate amounts of money107 on Y2K issues rely 
upon smaller businesses in some fashion. To that degree, they 
are at the mercy of the compliance efforts of their smaller busi-
ness suppliers. 
A study commissioned by Wells Fargo Bank revealed that 
nearly five million small businesses are at risk of Y2K com-
puter failures. The study, released in May 1998, found that 
75% of small-business owners familiar with Y2K had not yet 
taken remedial measures, and half either had no plans or did 
not consider it feasible to address the problem prior to January 
1, 2000.108 In a follow-up survey done six months later, the 
number of delinquent businesses remained high, at approxi-
mately 60%, and a third of small businesses still remained 
without a plan to address the problem.109 The study also found 
 
 107. A review of SEC filings for publicly traded companies reveals that billions of 
dollars are being spent on Y2K remediation efforts. Of note is the $600 million being 
spent by Citicorp, $500 million by AT&T, and $250 million by Chase Manhattan Bank. 
See Patterson, supra note 22, at 5. 
 108. See L.A. Lorek, Y2K Glitches Could Be Grist for Legal Mill, SUN-SENTINEL 
(Fort Lauderdale), May 28, 1998, at 1D. 
 109. See Joe Stewart-Mash, Y2K Bug Could Offer New Source of Work for Utah’s 
Computer-Savvy Attorneys, THE RECORD, Jan. 15, 1999, at A1. One particular industry 
at risk is the $1.5 trillion health-care profession, especially independently practicing 
physicians. A March 1999 Senate committee report revealed that 64% of hospitals were 
not testing their “Y2K compliant” computer systems and 82% of doctors’ offices were 
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that a disturbing 18% of small-business owners had either not 
heard of Y2K or did not understand the nature of the potential 
problem.110 
Regardless of the compliant computer systems of larger 
business entities, the trend among many small to mid-size 
businesses has been to leave the dormant Y2K monster well 
enough alone. If Fortune 500 companies such as General Mo-
tors, with nearly 100,000 total suppliers, are left vulnerable by 
noncompliant smaller companies, Y2K will be provided with its 
clearest pathway to economic destruction and may open the 
door for a litigation harvest by attorneys. 
3. Litigation over insurance issues 
Although a clear lack of insurance coverage may hinder the 
spread of litigation, if insurance coverage is disputed, attorneys 
are likely to be provided with ample new opportunities to liti-
gate. If Y2K problems come to fruition, insurance claims will 
likely be contested in a variety of settings. Only two will be dis-
cussed in this section: insurance recovery from damage to third 
parties and insurance claims for damage to an insured’s own 
property and economic relations. 
In cases where third parties have been injured by insureds’ 
Y2K malfunctions, the natural inclination will be for insureds 
to turn to their liability insurance carriers under assertions of 
negligence. Due to the imprecise nature of Y2K claims, insur-
ance companies will be sure to point fingers at other insurance 
companies. Questions will arise regarding whose insurers are 
responsible to pay: the manufacturer’s, the retailer’s, the in-
staller’s, or the consumer’s. Another discrepancy involves de-
termining the causal link between Y2K failure and bodily in-
jury or property damage covered under normal liability 
policies.111 In short, if Y2K miscues occur, personal injury ac-
tions and property damage to third parties are inevitable. In-
surance coverage issues are not well-defined and will certainly 
be fodder for courtroom banter. 
 
unaware of Y2K ramifications on their operating procedures. Richard Wolf, Congress 
Sounds Y2K Alarm, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 1999, at 1A. An article on the subject noted, 
“The health care problems threaten the flow of pharmaceuticals and the functioning of 
vital equipment. Medicare payments to doctors and hospitals might be delayed.” Id. 
 110. See Stewart-Mash, supra note 109, at A1. 
 111. See Marc S. Mayerson, Insurance Recovery for Year 2000 Losses, PENSION 
FUND LITIG. REP., July 23, 1998, at 6. 
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Other insurance coverage disputes include “mechanical 
breakdowns” and interruption of business operations resulting 
from Y2K computer failures. Standard “first-party property” 
coverages are generally written on either an “all risk” or a 
“named peril” basis.112 As the names imply, all-risk policies 
cover all losses regardless of how they occurred (with several 
exclusions), and named-peril policies cover only losses occur-
ring in a particular fashion.113 
Although this distinction appears to be straightforward, 
several intricacies provide employment opportunities for law-
yers. Typically, policies exclude several risks that might be re-
alized during a Y2K malfunction, such as utility service fail-
ures and mechanical breakdowns.114 In addition, a common 
exclusion is the “error, omission or deficiency in design” exclu-
sion.115 The question that will likely spark litigation, then, is 
whether the Y2K failure is a mechanical failure or simply a 
nonintegrated software failure. Furthermore, the nature of the 
“design” and the coverage of economic losses may be called into 
question, because they are generally covered only if related to a 
first-party property loss covered in the policy.116 The nuances 
involved in sorting out these issues tend to support predictions 
of substantial Y2K-related work for attorneys. 
4. Class action and shareholder suits 
“Analysts predict that no sector of the economy will be im-
mune from suits by disgruntled shareholders following a Year 
2000 failure.”117 Shareholder suits will be especially common as 
Y2K becomes the whipping boy for all significant drops or false 
inflation of stock prices. As has been seen in the early stages of 
Y2K litigation, the largest percentage of cases has been share-
holder suits which have resulted in the largest monetary set-
tlements. Additionally, actions of directors and officers in 
preparation for Y2K will be scrutinized and subject to class ac-
tion suits, as already evidenced in multiple Y2K cases.118 Ca-
pers Jones, President of Software Productivity Research, has 
 
 112. See id. at 8. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. See Medical Manager cases, supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
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predicted that the careers of half of the senior executives in the 
United States will be fatally challenged by the Y2K epidemic.119 
The other incentive for class action and shareholder suits 
belongs to law firms, especially those with established class ac-
tion “market share.” Activities by Milberg Weiss, for example, 
have already foreshadowed what might be in store for corpora-
tions in the Year 2000.120 According to Jeffrey Klafter of Bern-
stein Litowitz Berger & Grossman, another major player in the 
class action market, the early Y2K cases are merely the tip of 
the iceberg. Klafter conceded, however, that the early cases 
were filed as much for marketing reasons as they were for ad-
judicatory purposes.121 
Regardless of the current public relation reasons for filing 
Y2K suits, it is evident that the Y2K class-action cash cow will 
be milked for all it is worth by firms with established expertise 
in this area. The shareholder suit against officers and direc-
tors, however, may be tenuously situated upon judicial prece-
dent. Officer and director activity, long governed by the busi-
ness judgment rule, could be insulated from Y2K litigation 
losses, especially if strenuous and well-documented preventive 
measures are taken now by large, deep-pocketed corporations 
that logically would be the target of shareholder suits. 
B. The Barriers to a One Trillion Dollar Attorney Payday 
Despite a variety of factors which substantiate attorney op-
timism of riding the coattails of Y2K litigation, significant bar-
riers exist which may terminate the ride before it begins. As 
the ensuing section is developed, it will become obvious that at-
torney optimism will be objectively transformed into realism as 
barriers are discussed which indicate that Y2K will not become 
the financial panacea for a saturated legal job market. 
 
1. Governmental intervention 
The government may have the largest say of all in limiting 
Y2K litigation. In other words, even if Y2K problems explode 
upon the scene in the months following the turn of the year and 
all the imaginable associated problems come to fruition, litiga-
 
 119. See Dunn, supra note 71. 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
 121. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
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tion figures may still be limited by governmental action. 
a. Federal legislation. The federal government made its first 
move in this arena by passing the Year 2000 Information and 
Readiness Disclosure Act in October 1998.122 The Act, also 
known by the alias of the “Good Samaritan” law, provides com-
panies with an exemption from antitrust laws in order to facili-
tate the free exchange of Y2K-pertinent information.123 
The formal purpose of the Act is three-fold: first, to promote 
disclosure and exchange of Y2K readiness and compliance in-
formation; second, to facilitate rapid response to Y2K problems; 
and third, to promote a uniformity among states regarding the 
exchange and disclosure of Y2K readiness information.124 In the 
words of the Act’s two main sponsors, Representatives Christo-
pher Cox and David Dreier of California, the Act is intended to 
“encourage a voluntary exchange of information between peo-
ple interested in fixing (the year 2000 problem) . . . so they 
don’t get bogged down in negotiations of who’s responsible if 
the repairs don’t work, or face so much liability that they don’t 
get repairs fixed.”125 
Despite the statute’s clear purpose, its practical ramifica-
tions have been all but clear. The law provided opportunities to 
companies who made past statements regarding Y2K readiness 
to retreat and revise the statements at their discretion. The 
law did not come, however, without limitations. The rub was 
that statements had to be corrected by December 3, 1998. The 
law took effect on October 18, 1998.126 
The dilemma for attorneys, during what amounted to be a 
forty-five-day grace period, was that even though companies 
had an inherent interest in reclassifying any suspect state-
ments that might subject them to future litigation, reclassify-
ing their previous statements would be tantamount to admit-
ting previous deception, thus calling even more attention to 
their suspect statements.127 Also, even though the revised “Y2K 
disclosure statement” could not be entered into evidence in a 
 
 122. See Pub. L. No. 105-271, Oct. 19, 1998, 112 Stat. 2386 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§1 note (West Supp. 1999)). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Virginia Baldwin Hick, Y2K Mania Brings About Readiness Disclosure Alert, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 1998, at 13 (quoting Christopher Cox). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See Newman, supra note 73. 
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suit against a company, the Act did nothing to prevent suits 
supported by other evidence. Companies remain responsible for 
the express terms in existing software warranty agreements.128 
Y2K opportunists took perhaps what will be their greatest 
blow when another piece of federal legislation—the “Y2K 
Act”—was signed into law by President Clinton in July 1999.129 
Among other things, the Y2K Act provides new protection to 
defendants in Y2K litigation and requires civil procedure pro-
tocol that is specific to Y2K cases. In pertinent part, the Act (1) 
imposes a prelitigation notice period; (2) caps punitive dam-
ages; (3) establishes proportionate liability; (4) imposes a strict 
duty upon plaintiffs to mitigate damages; (5) bestows original 
jurisdiction over Y2K class action cases upon federal courts; 
and (6) exempts claims involving personal injury, death, or vio-
lation of federal securities laws from the purview of the Act.130 
The Y2K Act requires plaintiffs to provide defendants with 
notice prior to filing suit. A defendant then has thirty days to 
either initiate remediation of the Y2K failure or enter alterna-
tive dispute resolution, either of which must be completed 
within ninety days of the initial notice. Punitive damages are 
limited in a majority of cases to the lesser of $250,000 or three 
times compensatory damages. Additionally, in tort cases, de-
fendants are only required to pay damages in proportion to the 
percentage of their responsibility. In contract cases, however, 
defendants can be jointly and severally liable.131 
The Y2K Act also provides for a reduction in damages 
where a plaintiff has failed to mitigate. In addition to providing 
federal district courts with original jurisdiction over Y2K class 
actions, the Act allows state court Y2K class actions to be re-
moved to federal court, unless (1) the parties are predomi-
nantly from one state, (2) the defendants are predominantly 
governmental entities, (3) the class is not seeking punitive 
damages, or (4) the claim for damages is less than ten million 
dollars.132 
The stated purpose of the Act is (1) to provide incentive to 
solve Y2K problems at a point nearest to their inception; (2) to 
 
 128. Richard Burnett, New Millennium-Bug Law May Be Useless, But Not That 
Harmful, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 1998, at 13. 
 129. Pub. L. No. 106-37, July 20, 1999, 113 Stat. 185. 
 130. See 113 Stat. at 188-89. 
 131. See 113 Stat. at 192-93. 
 132. See 113 Stat. at 201-02. 
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encourage continued remediation and testing; (3) to encourage 
all parties involved to solve Y2K problems by methods of alter-
native dispute resolution; and (4) “to lessen the burdens on in-
terstate commerce by discouraging insubstantial lawsuits 
while preserving the ability of individuals and businesses that 
have suffered real injury to obtain complete relief.”133 
Additional legislation still pending in committee as of the 
beginning of the fourth quarter of 1999 includes (1) the “Year 
2000 Consumer Protection Plan Act of 1999,”134 which estab-
lishes judicial and administrative proceedings for resolving 
Y2K legal disputes; (2) the “Businesses Undergoing the Glitch 
Act (BUG Act),”135 allowing a tax deduction for small business 
compliancy expenditures; and (3) the “New Year’s Day Holiday 
2000,”136 a bill designating Monday, January 3, 2000 as a legal 
holiday where all affected businesses would have “an addi-
tional day, prior to the start of the workweek, to begin repairs 
on failed computer systems caused by the Year 2000 computer 
problem.”137 
b. State legislation. As of this writing, twenty-eight states 
had passed legislation limiting their liability in the case of year 
2000 breakdowns.138 Most of the proposed legislation has a 
common theme, such as varying levels of governmental immu-
nity, suits limited to actions brought in contract and limita-
tions on punitive damages. Several states, however, have in-
cluded unique provisions that will be discussed in the ensuing 
paragraphs. 
Alaska’s legislation, H.B. 82,139 provides immunity for busi-
nesses and boards of directors based on six basic preventative 
steps.140 H.B. 82 further provides a level of immunity for busi-
 
 133. See 113 Stat. at 187. 
 134. H.R. 192, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 135. H.R. 179, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 136. H.R.J. Res. 14, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 137. Information Technology Association of America Website, Y2K Federal Le- 
gislation—Pending (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.itaa.org/year2000/legis1.htm>  
(summarizing all federal Y2K legislation, including information on the status of each 
bill and, where available, links to the texts of the bills). 
 138. See Information Technology Association of America Website, Y2K State Legis-
lation—Pending (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.itaa.org/year2000/legis2.htm> 
(summarizing all state Y2K legislation pending in all fifty states, including information 
on the status of each bill and, where available, links to the texts of the bills). 
 139. H.B. 82, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999). 
 140. Businesses or Directors are not liable under the Alaska legislation if they: 
  (1) inventoried the electronic devices that may experience Year 2000 prob-
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nesses with fewer than twelve employees and allows a recovery 
only for a showing of fraud. The bill prohibits civil action unless 
the defendant has been provided with notice and an opportu-
nity to correct the Y2K failure. Class actions under H.B. 82 are 
prohibited unless the aggregate claim exceeds $150,000.141 
Arizona’s S.B. 1294 enacts an emergency measure allowing 
an affirmative defense against liability suits.142 The low 
threshold for use of the affirmative defense includes “reason-
able reliance” on false or misleading Y2K information, “reason-
able examination” to determine if Y2K problems existed, and 
“good faith” repair efforts.143 
Other noteworthy components of either passed or proposed 
state legislation include Indiana’s requirement of arbitration or 
mediation to resolve Y2K disputes;144 Massachusetts’s immu-
nity for hospitals and health system employees, directors, 
shareholders, representatives, and agents between the dates of 
September 30, 1999 and December 31, 2005;145 and Oklahoma’s 
complete elimination of class action suits and limitation of 
suits to damages specifically (and not consequentially) caused 
by computer failures.146 
In short, even if all of the anticipated Year 2000 factors 
conspire to provide a rich harvest for trial lawyers, the Y2K 
money tree may be pruned by governments at a variety of lev-
els. This fact alone places a damper on the predicted trillion 
dollar employment market for attorneys. The fate of pending 
legislation will continue to affect the possibility of Y2K-related 
litigation. Currently, however, whether or to what degree gov-
 
lems; 
  (2) identified critical electronic computing devices necessary to conduct busi-
ness operations; 
  (3) identified the potential for year 2000 date changes; 
  (4) prepared a plan to fix, repair, replace, or remedy the appropriate devices; 
  (5) complied with industry regulations or requirements relative to the Year 
2000 date change; and, 
  (6) developed contingency plans. 
Id. 
 141. Information Technology Association of America Website, Enacted Year 2000 
Liability/Immunity Legislation (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.itaa.org/year2000/ 
legis2.htm>. 
 142. S.B. 1294, 44th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 1999). 
 143. Id. 
 144. S.B. 666, 111th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1999). 
 145. S.B. 503, 181st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 1999). 
 146. H.B. 1325, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1999). 
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ernmental intervention will occur are questions that remain 
unanswered. 
2. Use of alternative methods for resolving Y2K disputes 
The possibility of alternative forums for resolving Y2K dis-
putes militates against a Wild West-like litigation free-for-all. 
Arbitration, mediation, and special tribunals are all viable ex-
isting systems used in resolving legal disputes. As seen in both 
Young v. J. Baker, Inc.147 and ASE Limited v. INCO Alloys In-
ternational, Inc.,148 alternative forums have already been suc-
cessfully used in resolving Y2K-related cases. 
Many technology companies favor the establishment of a 
solitary arbitration system to deal with Y2K legal problems 
and are lobbying Congress to create an arbitration forum for 
Y2K problems which would limit remedies to actual dam-
ages.149 Jan Amundson, general counsel for the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, indicated that many U.S. corpora-
tions favor establishing a mandatory arbitration procedure to 
resolve Y2K disputes,150 describing such a course of action as 
“ ‘less contentious and more realistic politically.’ ”151 
Trial lawyers have opposed such attempts to establish al-
ternative measures, describing them as “ ‘tort reform in sheep’s 
clothing.’ ”152 As opposed to arbitration, which results in bind-
ing adjudication, many corporations are advocating the more 
flexible forum of mediation. Mediation does not bind the par-
ties, nor does it absolve parties of their right to litigate. It does, 
however, provide a structured forum to facilitate negotiation 
and dispute resolution between disputing parties. 
Mediation is already the treatment of choice for many U.S. 
corporations, particularly when the parties have a history of 
business dealings and intend to preserve working relationships 
in the future.153 As compared to arbitration, and especially to 
litigation, mediation is inexpensive and quick, often taking one 
 
 147. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Stepanek, supra note 25, at 48. 
 150. See Abhrams, supra note 100. 
 151. Stepanek, supra note 25, at 48 (quoting Jan Amundson). 
 152. Id. (quoting Richard Middleton Jr., president-elect of the Association of Trial 
Lawyers of America). 
 153. See F. Peter Phillips, Pledge Now to Mediate, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999, at 
S42, S43. 
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day, as opposed to a median duration of sixty days for arbitra-
tion. If, for some reason, mediation fails, the options of arbitra-
tion or litigation still exist. Most often, however, mediation 
works. More than eighty-five percent of mediated commercial 
disputes are settled on mutually favorable terms.154 Even in-
conclusive mediation is often beneficial since issues are nar-
rowed and “communications enhanced” as the process moves to 
either arbitration or litigation.155 
Many companies have already made substantial commit-
ments to mediation. The CPR Year 2000 Commitment, a docu-
ment committing its signatories to “ ‘negotiate and, failing to 
negotiation, to mediate any Year 2000 Dispute,’ ” has already 
been signed by numerous corporations. American Standard, 
Bank of America, CIGNA, General Mills, McDonald’s, and 
Philip Morris are among the many companies that have al-
ready committed to mediation in an attempt to avoid an ava-
lanche of civil litigation.156 
Although mediation may be the answer for disputes among 
huge conglomerates, it may be inherently distasteful to the 
small plaintiff and especially inappropriate for resolving class 
action suits. While the “good old boys’ ” club of corporate giants 
may be willing to mediate privately their disputes in order to 
avoid gouging each other, smaller businesses may not be will-
ing to submit their claims before a mediator. Regardless, the 
option of mediation may forestall a sizeable portion of Y2K dis-
putes that would otherwise be destined for court dockets. 
One other suggestion has been for Congress to establish 
“special tribunals” akin to bankruptcy courts to deal with Y2K 
legal altercations.157  However, it may already be too late to es-
tablish one. An analogous option, offered by some commenta-
tors, is not to create a new court system, but to consolidate Y2K 
cases in one court.158 Such an option currently exists for corpo-
rate law in Delaware’s Chancery Court. By keeping Y2K com-
puter disputes in one court, businesses could resolve disputes 
in the civil justice system in front of judges with expertise on 
the pertinent issues. 
Despite the fact that no universal decision has been made 
 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at S42. 
 157. See Stepanek, supra note 25, at 48. 
 158. See id. 
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as an alternative to litigation, the existence of alternative op-
tions tends to indicate that a potential tidal wave of litigation 
would be diverted into alternate channels before being allowed 
to strike shore with full force. Public policy itself may dictate 
that this be so. Additionally, the increasing commitment of cor-
porate America to proxies for litigation cannot be overlooked. 
3. The inability of the insurance industry to fund litigation 
The question of Y2K-related employment for attorneys ex-
plores not simply whether attorneys will get more work, but 
whether they will get dramatically more paid work. On one 
hand, as mentioned above, the lack of clarity regarding insur-
ance coverage could result in increased litigation and a pipeline 
of employment opportunities for lawyers. If insurance coverage 
is implicated, industry reserves could go bankrupt, resulting in 
a flurry of litigation. On the other hand, if the insurance indus-
try removes its hand from Y2K coverage, then a large source of 
attorney revenue will be lost. 
Part of the lack of insurance coverage is due to the nature 
of Y2K itself. Most standard commercial liability policies will 
not cover Y2K computer malfunctions because Y2K does not 
represent an accident like fire or water damage.159 Also, the 
fixed-date nature of Y2K creates a decreasing investment re-
turn period (the period between collecting premiums and po-
tentially paying out on losses shortens as the calendar moves 
into the year 2000). For these reasons, many insurers are ei-
ther excluding Y2K from their coverage or are charging exorbi-
tant amounts for specific Y2K coverage.160 
The Insurance Services Office has already developed and 
promulgated standard Y2K exclusion language. The language 
leaves little room for doubt, as policies explicitly exclude cover-
age for losses “ ‘due to the inability of [computer systems] to 
correctly recognize, process, distinguish, interpret or accept the 
year 2000 and beyond.’ ”161 By the beginning of 1999, the Office 
had already received permission from forty-eight states for in-
surance companies to deny Y2K claims.162 
 
 159. See Jennifer Scott, Marion Software Company Sued Over Y2K Bug, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 19, 1998, at 1F. 
 160. See Mayerson, supra note 111, at 9-10. 
 161. Id. at 9 (quoting Insurance Services Office language). 
 162. See Patterson, supra note 22, at 11. 
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Some insurers, fearful of coverage disputes under standard 
policies, have introduced Y2K-specific coverage. Such coverage, 
however, is generally attainable only for businesses with a 
taste for caviar. Most programs require a preliminary risk as-
sessment costing as much as $50,000,163 an expensive nonre-
fundable application process indeed. Furthermore, the policies 
often require follow-up assessments, again paid out of the in-
sured’s pocket. If a company passes the $50,000 test, the re-
ward is an up-front premium costing as much as seventy-five 
percent of the coverage itself. The peace of mind, then, of hav-
ing $100 million in Y2K coverage would cost a mere $75 mil-
lion. The good news is that many policies will rebate all but ten 
to fifteen percent of the premium if, come January 1, somehow 
computers are smart enough to know that “00” is 2000 and not 
1900.164 
Insurance coverage issues will likely be related to bank-
ruptcy claims. Uninsured, or even some insured, businesses 
could file for bankruptcy due to Y2K-related causes. The rate of 
Y2K-precipitated bankruptcies has been predicted to be as high 
as five to seven percent.165 Although the bankruptcy issue may 
provide more work for attorneys, the dilemma remains as to 
whether uninsured bankrupt defendants in Y2K suits will have 
sufficient assets to fill the trillion dollar litigation coffer. 
To clarify, the role of insurance is not any clearer than Y2K 
itself. At best it is a capricious one. Common law precedent will 
do much to determine the role insurance will play in Y2K dis-
putes. If the insurance industry as a whole shies away from 
specific Y2K coverage, and legal precedent absolves insurers of 
liability, attorneys may spend hours in inadvertent pro-bono 
litigation suing small to midsize businesses without the finan-
cial capital to pay significant settlements. If this is the case, a 
large portion of the trillion dollar attorney boon will certainly 
go unrealized. 
4. Miscellaneous and x-factors 
Perhaps the most determinative factor discrediting the idea 
that a new employment paradigm will engulf and enrich attor-
neys everywhere is the cumulative effect of several key, yet less 
 
 163. See Mayerson, supra note 111, at 9-10. 
 164. See id. at 10. 
 165. See Patterson, supra note 22, at 5. 
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documentable, ingredients. These factors, placed on the bal-
ance with governmental intervention, alternate means of dis-
pute resolution, and lack of insurance coverage will tip the 
scale against a new frontier of attorney employment. These 
more subtle contingencies will be addressed briefly in this pe-
nultimate section. 
Heavily ignored by many Y2K litigation optimists is the 
fact that litigation and Y2K problems, at a certain level, be-
come a zero-sum game. If January 1, 2000, and subsequent 
days arrive without Y2K incident, attorneys will obviously be 
out of luck regarding computer-glitch litigation until perhaps 
Y3K. At the other extreme, if the apocalyptic Y2K doomsayers 
turn out to be correct, it is likewise unlikely that attorneys will 
be anteing up for a trillion dollar jackpot. In other words, when 
attorneys’ clients are living without electricity, heat, and 
plumbing, and their primary focus is upon obtaining or main-
taining supplies of food and water, it is unlikely that one dollar 
of litigation will occur, let alone one trillion. Additionally, if 
Y2K problems are rampant, but do not limit daily life to grind-
ing wheat and hauling buckets of water from the river, the at-
torney litigation bonanza could be limited by the inability of 
courts to add Y2K issues to already saturated dockets. Several 
more radical commentators suggest that if Y2K computer casu-
alties are widespread, courts will necessarily limit Y2K cases to 
personal injury and criminal cases. Under a similar scenario, 
for public policy reasons, higher courts may establish stare de-
cisis standards that limit the ability of plaintiff attorneys to 
successfully litigate and receive lucrative settlements. 
It appears, then, that the window of opportunity to change 
the face of attorney employment is a narrow one. Few or no 
Y2K problems obviously kills the proposition immediately. 
Moderate Y2K problems, consistent with what has been seen 
during 1999, result in “just another day at the office” for law-
yers. The window of opportunity lies somewhere in the sliver 
between catastrophic Y2K disaster and widespread problems 
that are of less than epidemic proportions. 
Even if this window opens for attorneys, another important 
question must be answered: Will one trillion dollars of em-
ployment revenue be distributed per capita among the nation’s 
thousands of attorneys, or will the new employment windfall be 
only for the rich who will be made substantially richer? If the 
early returns on Y2K litigation are any indicator, it is not a 
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radical departure from logical thought to envision a total of one 
trillion dollars of litigation as a sum result of 1,000 lawsuits 
filed by Milberg Weiss at one billion dollars each. In such a 
scenario, small town lawyers and even large town firms that 
are not substantial class action or shareholder suit players will 
receive little benefit from the Y2K boon. 
Finally, and perhaps the greatest limiting factor in a Y2K-
initiated paradigm shift for attorney employment, is the coun-
terproductive effect that Y2K litigation will have on the eco-
nomic marketplace. It is unlikely that corporations will destroy 
their longtime symbiotic relationship with suppliers and cus-
tomers by dragging them into court. Likewise, suppliers may 
be reticent to “bite the hand that feeds” by suing their clients. 
Many businesses have already recognized the counterpro-
ductive effect that such litigation would have on supply chains 
and on business operations in general, and have built antiliti-
gation stipulations into contractual language. Such contractual 
language, if honored, could severely limit Y2K litigation. Fur-
thermore, consumer or shareholder suits against companies 
will have a counterproductive effect on the marketplace, poten-
tially causing a dramatic increase in the cost of goods and a 
general devaluation of share worth. In general, if all parties in-
volved in the mechanism of the marketplace are able to “count 
to ten” before jumping on the litigation bandwagon, they will 
likely be able to see the larger picture and realize that litiga-
tion may be a short term payoff that will be more than spent in 
paying for long term damage to the national and global eco-
nomic marketplace. 
C. The Tale of the Scale: The Results of the Balancing Test 
In summary, an analysis of the pertinent Y2K-related fac-
tors reveals that the odds are heavily stacked against a Y2K-
created employment paradigm for attorneys. Admittedly, com-
puters have invaded nearly every nook and cranny of our daily 
routines. Many small businesses, the core of American eco-
nomic structure, have left themselves open to the ravages of 
Y2K through foolish unpreparedness. Insurance ambiguities 
inviting litigation permeate coverage that will be invoked, or at 
least arguably invoked, by Y2K computer failures. Shareholder 
and class actions seem to be custom-made suits, tailored spe-
cifically to the measurements of Y2K. At first blush, then, the 
convergence of these factors appears to point toward a litiga-
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tion harvest never before seen by attorneys; a trillion dollar 
crop that will only increase in worth as computer bugs infest it. 
On the other side of the scale, however, are factors that 
could individually outweigh the total weight of the pro factors, 
and when placed together, certainly tip the scales against the 
prospect of a Y2K employment bonanza for lawyers. Govern-
mental intervention may be sufficient in and of itself to end the 
trillion dollar harvest before it begins. Federal and state legis-
lation is heavily skewed toward preventing a litigation free-for-
all in both the public and private sectors. If even a moderate 
percentage of such legislation is enacted into law, the ceiling, 
instead of the sky, will be the limit for aggressive Y2K lawyers. 
Although not as powerful a deterrent as governmental pro-
hibitions, the existence and current use of alternative forums 
for dispute resolution seriously negates the prospect of huge 
compensatory and punitive damages settlements hoped for by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Whether arbitration, mediation, a special 
court system, or issue-concentrated courts, forums outside the 
traditional court setting will necessarily limit dollar figures 
arising out of Y2K dispute resolutions. 
The insurance factor, found on the pro side of the scale, will 
be negated by its presence on the con side as well. Explicit ex-
clusion of Y2K issues from insurance policies, leaving a busi-
ness without the ability to pay claims against it, will certainly 
hinder the process of filling the trillion dollar piggy bank. 
Likewise, shareholder and class actions on both sides of the 
equation will likely cancel each other out. As mentioned above, 
even if large figures result from class action and shareholder 
lawsuits, much of that money will remain in the hands of a se-
lect few. 
The determinative blow against the trillion dollar figure 
may be the combination of the counterproductive nature of liti-
gation in a Y2K setting and the limited window of opportunity 
provided by Y2K itself. Potential parties in suits may see the 
light before seeking to ruin mutually beneficial relationships 
through cutthroat litigation. Past business relationships and a 
hope for continued business dealings may serve to quell ani-
mosity created by Y2K computer failures. This final factor adds 
further mass to a balance already tipped heavily against a tril-
lion dollar payday for attorneys. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether Y2K will open a new field of em-
ployment for attorneys will be answered with some clarity by 
the middle of the year 2000. The trillion dollar legal boon for 
attorneys is contingent not only upon widespread computer 
problems but a variety of other factors which must converge to 
create the narrow window of opportunity for unprecedented at-
torney employment. After balancing all of the most pertinent 
factors, it is apparent that this window is unlikely to open, and 
although Y2K will find itself listed in attorney files and on 
court dockets, attorney employment resulting from Y2K will be 
a disappointing distance from one trillion dollars. 
David M. Kono 
